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Editorial on the Research Topic
What’s Shared in Sharing Tasks and Actions? Processes and Representations Underlying Joint
Performance
SIX BLIND MEN AND AN ELEPHANT
There is an ancient story about six blind men who met to discuss what an elephant is like. Each of
them touched a different part of the elephant and came up with an image of what an elephant was
like. The first man touched its leg and thought that an elephant was like a pillar; the second man
touched its ear and thought that an elephant was like a fan; the third man touched its trunk and
thought that an elephant was like a snake, and so on. The six blind men, the six different images
of what an elephant was like. The six men quarreled over an elephant, until they realized that they
touched different parts of the same elephant. How can these blind men ever learn what an elephant
is really like? Doing so requires integrating other people’s images of an elephant into their own, the
process known as co-representation.
The story of six blind men and an elephant offers several morals. One of the morals is that it
is very difficult to see the whole from its parts, especially when the parts are distributed among
different individuals. This poses a challenge that individual actors face when they share a task with
co-actors, and it is important to understand cognitive mechanisms that meet the challenge. The
present research topic aimed at bringing together different approaches and perspectives to the study
of sharing tasks and actions between co-acting individuals. It was hoped that these perspectives
would collectively present a big picture that delineates the cognitive processes and representations
underlying joint performance.
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THE BEGINNING: SHARING TASKS AND
ACTIONS
The last decade has seen a surge of interest in experimental
studies of joint task performance. These studies have suggested
that actors who share a single task not only perform it together,
but also share a mental representation of the whole task; that
is, actors co-represent both their and their co-actors portion of
the task. Initial evidence supporting the idea of co-representation
was garnered through the joint Simon task (Sebanz et al., 2003),
wherein pairs of actors divide the work involved in performing a
choice reaction task. In the standard version of the Simon task
with a single actor, response times (RT) are shorter when the
responses spatially correspond to the location of stimuli (e.g.,
pressing a left key to circles on the left side of a computer
monitor) than when they do not (pressing a left key to circles
on the right). This Simon effect disappears if the task setting is
altered in such a way that spatial attributes of stimuli or choice
of responses are eliminated. For example, in a go/nogo version of
the task, the actor responds to a type of stimulus (e.g., red circles)
by pressing one key and withholds responding to another type of
stimulus (green circles). The Simon effect disappears in this task
context because only a single response is involved in the task, so
the spatial attribute is no longer used to represent the response
and there is no response conflict to resolve. However, the Simon
effect re-emerges when two actors perform the go/nogo version
of the task together. In this joint Simon task, each co-actor
operates one of the two response keys to respond to one type of
stimulus, and is told to withhold a response when the stimulus
assigned to their partner is presented. The critical finding of these
studies is that RTs are still shorter if stimuli occur on the same side
as the response location than if they occur on the opposite side.
This finding has been used to argue that co-acting individuals
co-represent (or share a mental representation of) the task.
THIRTEEN ARTICLES, THIRTY-SEVEN
AUTHORS, AND ONE CONCLUSION?
More than a decade after the original study, the joint
Simon task still remains to be a popular paradigm of task
sharing, but in more complex situations that involve multiple
modalities (Dolk and Liepelt) or a large number of display
items (Baess et al.) and with more elaborate measures, such
as autocorrelation (Ciardo and Wykowska) and sequential
modulations (Mendl et al.) of RTs as well as event-related
potentials (Michel et al.). Other behavioral paradigms have
also been developed to study interpersonal phenomena in
a joint task setting, such as attentional blink in the rapid
sequential visual presentation (Constable et al.), four alternative
forced choice (Czeszumski et al.), line bisection (Dosso et al.),
stimulus and response priming in a prime-probe task (Giesen
et al.), and Stroop interference (Yamaguchi et al.). As in the
Simon task, these paradigms measure discrete actions (e.g.,
pressing a key), but paradigms that require continuous actions
have also made important contributions to our understanding
of joint performance (Ray and Welsh; Rocca and Cavallo;
Wahn et al.).
Studies of task sharing now demonstrate a variety of issues in
joint tasks and actions. Several groups investigated the influences
of interpersonal relationships on joint tasks and actions (Ciardo
and Wykowska; Czeszumski et al.; Giesen et al.; Mendl et al.)
while others examined the influences of joint settings on the
frame of reference (Baess et al.; Dolk and Liepelt; Dosso et al.; Ray
and Welsh). Although most studies in this collection focused on
co-representation (integration) between co-acting individuals,
others pointed out the importance of a division of labor in
task sharing (Constable et al.; Wahn et al.; Yamaguchi et al.).
The neural basis of joint task performance is still an under-
investigated area of study (Czeszumski et al.; Michel et al.) that
requires further development in future research.
The present collection includes 13 articles by 37 authors.
What these studies tell us about task sharing? In a nutshell, most
studies in the present collection found little evidence for co-
representation (Baess et al.; Constable et al.; Dolk and Liepelt;
Dosso et al.; Michel et al.; Yamaguchi et al.) or limited support
for co-representation that was conditional on the interpersonal
relationship with the co-acting partners (Ciardo and Wykowska;
Giesen et al.; Czeszumski et al.; Mendl et al.; Ray and Welsh).
After the initial demonstration of co-representation (Sebanz
et al., 2003), a large number of studies have explored conditions
under which co-representation occurs or does not occur (e.g.,
Welsh et al., 2009; Dittrich et al., 2013; Yamaguchi et al., 2018).
These efforts have enriched the empirical ground to understand
cognitive processes and representations underlying joint task
performance, and alternative accounts of task sharing have been
proposed (e.g., Dittrich et al., 2012; Dolk et al., 2014; Prinz,
2015; Yamaguchi et al., 2019). The present collection adds further
empirical evidence to aid such efforts. They imply that the six
blind men still have difficulty seeing what a real elephant is like,
but we have started to understand why it is so difficult to see
the elephant.
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